

Agamemnon's surrender, viewed this way, gains "human intelligibility." It also demonstrates to Clytemnestra Agamemnon's involvement with Cassandra. This foreshadows her later avowal that one of the reasons she killed her husband was the offense she took at the women he enjoyed as warlord (1438–41, and cf. 1263). Moreover, it brings to the foreground the eternal triangle and its important function in the *Agamemnon*, which presents the appalling problem of the *Oresteia*. For the trio here—Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, and Cassandra—is only one of several such groups of three that will ultimately compel Orestes to kill his mother.

The first triangle, the "destruction (ἄτη) that began it all" (1192), is the adultery of Thyestes with the wife of his brother Atreus (1193), for which the latter took a most horrible revenge. All the males of the next generation are similarly involved, as one triangle brings about the next. There are the two sons of Atreus: Menelaus, whose wife left him for Paris and caused the Trojan war (61–67, and *passim*); and Agamemnon, who leads that war, alienates Clytemnestra by sacrificing Iphigenia for it (224–29, and *passim*), and returns with a concubine to face his wife in our scene. There is also the one surviving son of Thyestes, Aegisthus, who takes advantage both of Agamemnon's absence and of Clytemnestra's resentment to fill the empty place in their marital bed; from there he plots his revenge for Atreus' retaliation against his father (1223–25; 1577–1611, esp. 1604). Before long Agamemnon will have paid with his life for having sacrificed Iphigenia and for having returned with Cassandra, as well as for being the son of the slaughterer of Thyestes' children. And the spilt blood will wait for the avenger, Orestes, and the *Choephoroe*.<sup>24</sup>

Of all these groups of three, only the one treated here appears on stage in the *Agamemnon* in a three-actor scene. Because of the recent introduction of the third actor, the audience is likely to have been aware of the potential of such a presentation. The significance of the actors' number, however, is translated into drama only when the king appeals to his wife on behalf of his concubine. And that, as I have suggested, is part and parcel of Agamemnon's yielding.<sup>25</sup>

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24. See 1646–48. Clytemnestra will kill Cassandra, too, for having been brought by Agamemnon. Her death will also be avenged by Orestes: see 1279–83, 1317–19.

25. I wish to thank my colleagues and friends, Mrs. D. Gera and Dr. N. Zagagi, for their constructive discussion and suggestions; and the referees of *CP* and the Editor for their useful criticism.

## SOME PASSAGES IN MAXIMUS OF TYRE

Small words have a nasty habit of disappearing from manuscripts without permission; I begin with a few passages which seem to betray stylistic blemishes due to this cause.

### 2. 4 (p. 22. 4–6 Hobein):

τὸ δὲ βαρβαρικόν, ὁμοίως μὲν ἅπαντες ξυνετοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, κατεστήσαντο δὲ αὐτοῖς  
σημεῖα ἄλλοι ἄλλα. Πέρσαι μὲν πῦρ, ἄγαλμα ἐφήμερον, ἀκόρεστον καὶ  
ἀδηφάγον κτλ.

It looks as if a connective has dropped out in line 6: Πέρσαι μὲν <γάρ> πῦρ κτλ.

2. 8 (pp. 25. 16–26. 1 H.):

Κελτοὶ σέβουσιν μὲν Δία, ἄγαλμα δὲ Διὸς Κελτικὸν ὑψηλὴ δρυΐς. Παῖονες σέβουσιν μὲν Ἥλιον, ἄγαλμα δὲ Ἥλιου Παιονικὸν δίσκος βραχὺς ὑπὲρ μακροῦ ξύλου. Ἀράβιοι σέβουσι μὲν, ὄντινα δέ, οὐκ οἶδα· τὸ δὲ ἄγαλμα εἶδον, λίθος ἦν τετράγωνος.

25. 19 μὲν, ὄντινα : μὲν <θεὸν>, ὄντινα Meiser

The absolute σέβουσιν in line 19 seems very abrupt; the two preceding occurrences of σέβουσιν (lines 16 and 17) lead us to expect an object here. One understands why Meiser proposed a conjecture, but <θεὸν> cannot do, since it is generic (= “God,” “the deity,” vel sim.) in a passage where the specific gods of various races are being mentioned. If one requires a supplement, the simplest would be σέβουσι μὲν <θεὸν τινα>, ὄντινα δέ, οὐκ οἶδα. This provides the requisite sense and would have been easily liable to omission by haplography, especially when written in uncials with the standard abbreviation of the *nomen sacrum* θεός, thus: Θ̅NTINA ONTINA.

25. 7 (pp. 305. 13–306. 2 H.):

ἥδιστον ἦν θέαμα ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς (πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔμελλεν); οὐ διὰ τὴν ξανθὴν κόμην· καὶ γὰρ ὁ Εὐφόρβος εὐκόμης ἦν, τῷ δὲ Ἀχιλλεῖ τὸ καλὸν ἥδιστον ἦν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐξαπτόμενον.

Read <ἀλλ’> οὐ διὰ τὴν ξανθὴν κόμην. The argument requires the adversative particle and it seems guaranteed by the parallels on p. 306. 2 ff.: ἥδιστον μὲν <έν> ποταμοῖς ὁ Νεῖλος· ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ ἀφθονίαν ὕδατος . . . ἥδιστον θέαμα ὁ Νεῖλος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τολμῶ κτλ. Omission of ΑΛΛ after εΜεΛΛεΝ is easy enough.

26. 2 (p. 310. 10–14 H.):

. . . λόγων μὲν πάντα μεστὰ καὶ ψιθυρισμάτων, σοφιστῶν σοφισταῖς συμπιτόντων, ἔργου δὲ ἐρημία δεινὴ. καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὑπὲρ οὗ διέστηκεν καὶ διεστασίασται τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, οὐδεὶς ὀρᾷ.

The iteration of the article in τὸ θρυλούμενον τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν proves that τὸ ἀγαθόν was felt to be a quotation or fossilized phrase. Otherwise normal grammar would have led us to expect but one article, τὸ θρυλούμενον τοῦτο ἀγαθόν (τὸ . . . ἀγαθόν being the substantive). Contrast Pl. *Phlb.* 46C τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκὺ μειγμένον. In our sentence τὸ ἀγαθόν is manifestly emphatic. Refrain therefore either from deleting the second τὸ as a “dittography” (i.e., τὸ θρ. τοῦτο [τὸ] ἀγαθόν) or from placing a comma before τὸ ἀγαθόν, which would artificially separate the phrase from the demonstrative τοῦτο, whose position shows that it must go closely with τὸ ἀγαθόν.

That τὸ ἀγαθόν, “the Good,” had become proverbial is clear from a number of passages. Note especially the comic poet Amphis, frag. 6 Kock: τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν οὐ σὺ τυγχάνειν / μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἥττον οἶδα τοῦτ’ ἐγώ, / ὃ δέσποτ’, ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν.

In introducing quotations, proverbial expressions, and the like the particle δὴ is regularly found (as in Pl. *Phlb.*, loc. cit. above). Headlam provides an excellent sampling at Herodas 2. 45; see also Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup>, p. 325. It will suffice to cite a few typical instances: Pl. *Gorg.* 514E τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο (a frequent expression); id. *Soph.* 241D καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο; [Pl.] *Ax.* 365B τὸ κοινὸν δὴ τοῦτο . . . θρυλούμενον; Plut. *Lyc.* 10 τοῦτο δὴ τὸ θρυλούμενον. In Maximus compare 37. 2 (p. 428. 3) τὸ καλούμενον δὴ τοῦτο.

In this passage, therefore, the Greek would be more idiomatic if we were to read καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον <δὴ> τοῦτο “τὸ ἀγαθὸν” . . . οὐδεὶς ὀρᾷ.<sup>1</sup>

28. 4 (p. 337. 6–12 H.):

ὁ μὲν γάρ φησιν σὺν τῷ ὅλῳ ἰᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ μέρος, καὶ ἀδύνατον εἶναι σωτηρίαν παραγίνεσθαι τῷ μορίῳ, πρὶν καὶ τῷ παντὶ ἔλθῃ· ὀρθῶς λέγων, κἀγὼ πείθομαι, ὅσα γε ἐπὶ σώματος· ἐν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματος συζυγία ἀντιστρόφως φημί ἔχειν· ὃ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος καλῶς ἔχῃ, ἀνάγκη τὸ πᾶν τούτῳ ἔχειν καλῶς κτλ.

Normal Greek style all but demands ἀνάγκη <καὶ> τὸ πᾶν τούτῳ ἔχειν καλῶς. Compare above, lines 6–7 (σὺν τῷ ὅλῳ . . . καὶ τὸ μέρος) and 8 (τῷ μορίῳ, πρὶν καὶ τῷ παντί). I cite one example from Aristotle, as more would be superfluous, *MA* 699b32–34: ἄρα δὲ δεῖ τι ἀκίνητον εἶναι καὶ ἡρεμοῦν ἔξω τοῦ κινουμένου, μηδὲν ὄν ἐκείνου μορίον, ἢ οὐ; καὶ τοῦτο πότερον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς οὕτως ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον; in Maximus’ text the καὶ fell out by haplography with the final syllable of ἀνάγκη.

41. 5 (p. 483. 9–17 H.):

ἡ μὲν εὐδαίμων καὶ μακαρία ψυχὴ . . . ἄρχει τοῦ ἄρματος, καὶ κολάζει τὰς τῶν ἵππων ὀρμάς· οἱ δὲ εἰσὶν ἀτεχνῶς παντοδαποί, ἄλλος ἀλλαχοῦ θεῖν διωρμημένοι, ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἀδηφάγος καὶ ὕβριστής, ὁ δὲ θυμῶδης καὶ ἰτητικὸς καὶ ἐμπληκτός, ὁ δὲ νωθὴς καὶ ἐκκελυμένος, ὁ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος καὶ σμικρόφρων καὶ ταπεινός.

The inspiration for this allegory is of course the familiar myth in the *Phaedrus*, which Greeks of the later periods never wearied of imitating.<sup>2</sup> This sentence is carefully articulated, and the balanced structure is very strict; in the manuscript tradition three of the four ἵπποι have three epithets, one has only two, which is odd. Some adjective or participle has fallen out in line 16 where <καὶ ---> belongs either before or after καὶ ἐκκελυμένος. We cannot hope to recover the exact epithet and must be content with the recognition of a lacuna.

16. 2 (p. 198. 15–16 H.):

ταῦτά τοι ἐννοῶν, ἡγοῦμην δεῖν φροντιστέον εἶναί μοι κτλ.

15 δεῖν del. Davis : δὴ Heinsius : ἀεὶ Hahn

1. Headlam, loc. cit., remarks, “τὸ τοῦ λόγου δὴ τοῦτο, ‘as the saying goes’: such expressions are used adverbially or as objects of a verb, but never appear as the subject of it.” This observation has a general validity and would apply here, but an exception can be found at *Ar. Av.* 651–52 ἐν Αἰσώπου λόγοις / ἐστὶν λεγόμενον δὴ τι κτλ.

2. For the topos as modified by Maximus, see G. L. Koniaris, “On Maximus of Tyre: Zetemeta (I),” *CA* 1 (1982): 103, n. 37.

The reason why scholars have condemned δέῖν is obvious; it seems redundant in combination with φροντιστέον, which itself contains the requisite notion of obligation or necessity. Hence the expulsion of δέῖν as corruption or gloss. In reality, the joining of superfluous δέῖν with verbal adjectives and other expressions of necessity or propriety (e.g., ἀναγκαῖον . . . δέῖν) is thoroughly idiomatic and well attested in the writings of Plato (where its appearance has frequently misled scholars into “correcting” the text). This use of δέῖν is a natural, if mildly illogical, means of emphatic expression and may be compared with the common use of the double negative (in various languages) for similar purposes of emphasis.

As parallels for the occurrence of δέῖν specifically with a verbal adjective, see Pl. *Rep.* 535A ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἷου δέῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι and id. *Epist.* 7. 328B–C ἔρρεψε δέῖν . . . καὶ νῦν πειρατέον εἶναι.<sup>3</sup> Observe that in these passages, just as in Maximus, δέῖν *precedes* the verbal adjective. Furthermore, there is clearly discernible the additional tendency of the living language to conjoin δέῖν with a verb of thinking (οἷου δέῖν ~ ἡγούμεν δέῖν), even where the infinitive would appear to be superfluous. See LSJ, s.v. ἡγέομαι III. 4 and οἶομαι VI. 2 (where this “superfluous” use of δέῖν is explicitly recognized). In the present passage of Maximus δέῖν never should have been questioned.

23. 1 (p. 278. 9–11 H.):

ἄρα τοὺς ἐπὶ σκαπάνῃ καὶ αὐλακὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ διαπονουμένους, δεινοὺς ἀροῦν,  
ἀγαθοὺς φυτεύειν, ἐν ἀμήτῳ δεξιούς, ἐν ὀρχάτῳ φιλοπόνους;

It has gone undetected that in this sentence Maximus’ phrase δεινοὺς ἀροῦν, ἀγαθοὺς φυτεύειν is directly modeled on a verse of Tyrtaeus’, frag. 5. 3 West (= frag. 4. 3 Diehl): Μεσσήνην ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀροῦν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ φυτεύειν. Elsewhere Maximus often quotes or paraphrases passages from the classical authors, above all from Homer and Plato, which he introduces specifically to further his argument or thesis. Even of such passages not all have been noted in modern times, for example, 26. 1 (p. 307. 15–17 H.) αὐτὸς δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ, κούφῳ χρήματι καὶ πολυπλανεστέρῳ τῶν σωμάτων, πανταχοῦ περιεφέρετο, which is an obvious echo of Plato *Ion* 534B κούφον γὰρ χρήμα ποιητῆς ἐστὶν καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερὸν; it certainly would have been recognized as such by many an ancient reader.<sup>4</sup> The present case is somewhat different. Neither the source of the language nor the phraseology itself has any immediate relevance to the argument, and we may with reason be suspicious. Probably Maximus neither intended nor wished to be found out.

In this instance we can glimpse the author’s style in the making. Doubtless he was proud of the sentence which he had crafted; that he would borrow from the old poet Tyrtaeus is not without interest.<sup>5</sup> But a more interesting case, to my mind, is the following passage, 26. 5 (p. 314. 5–15 H.):

3. For this usage, see further my *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen, 1976), pp. 127–29. To the examples there cited add Pl. *Phdr.* 264B, *Soph.* 221A, *Symp.* 185E–86A; compare also Burnet at Arist. *EN* 1142b18.

4. Maximus applies the phrase κούφον χρήμα to the soul, Plato to the poet. Both, however, are discussing Homer, who is explicitly mentioned in each of the two passages. Maximus uses the phrase, of which he was clearly fond, again in 35. 6 (p. 409. 4 H.) of opinion, ἡ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δόξα, κούφον χρήμα.

5. Plato had done the same thing centuries before: see my “The Platonism of Lycurgus,” *GRBS* 11 (1970): 226–29. This particular verse seems to have been moderately well known. In Σ Pl. *Leg.* 629A,

αὐτίκα πεποιήται αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μεράκιον Θετταλικὸν καὶ ἀνὴρ βασιλικός, Ἀχιλλεύς καὶ Ἀγαμέμνων· ὁ μὲν ὑπ' ὀργῆς εἰς ὕβριν προφερόμενος, ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων, ὁ δὲ Ἀχιλλεύς προπηλακισθεὶς μνηιῶν· εἰκόνες παθῶν, νεότητος καὶ ἐξουσίας. ἀντίθεος τοι ἑκατέρῳ τὸν Νέστορα, παλαιὸν τῷ χρόνῳ, ἀγαθὸν φρονεῖν, δεινὸν εἰπεῖν. πάλιν αὖ Θερσίτης πεποιήται αὐτῷ αἰσχρὸς ἰδεῖν, φωνὴν ἐπεσβόλος, γνῶμην ἄτακτος, οἷος εἶναι εἰκὼν ἀκολάστου δήμου. ἀλλ' ἀντίθεος καὶ τοῦτ' ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, ἡγεμόνα ἀκριβῆ, ἐπιπορευόμενον κτλ.

In line 10 restore the idiomatic particle which has fallen out: <ἀλλ'> ἀντίθεος τοι κτλ. Maximus uses the identical phrase immediately below, line 14 ἀλλ' ἀντίθεος καὶ τοῦτ' κτλ., where the καὶ should be noted; it may well indicate that this is the second occurrence of ἀλλ' ἀντίθεος. For repeated ἀλλά with the imperative, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup>, p. 15. Such a corruption is readily explained here: uncial ΑΛΛ dropped out before ΑΝ.

Even granting the correctness of this conjecture (more proof of which anon), the sense of the passage is affected not at all, and the change is inconsequential. So at least it would seem. But let us linger a bit over this sentence.

Ἀντίθεος τοι, with or without a preceding ἀλλ', has not been recognized for what it is, namely, an unusual expression to turn up in prose; the little particle τοι tells us that. "τοι is far commoner in direct statements than in questions, wishes, commands, or subordinate clauses. . . . In other independent clauses [sc. than statements] (questions, commands, and wishes) the particle is much less common" (Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 539, 545). For instances of τοι with the imperative Denniston refers to Anacreon, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and but one prose occurrence, Pl. *Gorg.* 461E. In the Platonic passage the phrase in question is—ἀλλά ἀντίθεος τοι. That Maximus constantly alludes to and quotes Plato is too well known to require documentation; suffice it to note that in codex R, the archetype, Maximus is entitled Πλατωνικός φιλόσοφος. Observe now that in our passage Maximus has just adduced two "types," Achilles and Agamemnon; in the sentence immediately preceding the one in question he explains his meaning: εἰκόνες παθῶν, νεότητος καὶ ἐξουσίας. In the Platonic passage (*Gorg.* 461C–E) Socrates is talking with Polus; he explicitly contrasts himself and others of his age (unfavorably) with Polus and his contemporaries—πρεσβύτεροι versus νεώτεροι. In the sentence just before ἀλλά ἀντίθεος τοι Socrates mentions Athens, where there exists πλείστη . . . ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν. In other words, the same two motifs, νεότης and ἐξουσία, are prominent in this very passage of Plato.

The accumulation of coincidences, if coincidences they be, would be remarkable. Assume rather that Maximus had his Plato before him and everything falls into place, above all the particle τοι, so unexpected in prose with the imperative. Of course, if this analysis is correct, it becomes far more probable that Maximus wrote ἀλλ' ἀντίθεος τοι (or ἀλλά with *scriptio plena*: we could never know) and not ἀντίθεος τοι. Only the inexperienced will wish to see traces of *petitio principii* in this reasoning.

The story does not end here. For when Plato wrote ἀλλά ἀντίθεος τοι he was himself borrowing a poetic phrase. (After all, the τοι wants justification even in Plato.) Wilamowitz discerned a tragic tone in the expression, and Denniston and

which preserves it (also preserved in Olympiodorus *In Alcib.* I p. 103 Westerink), it is described as τὸ φερόμενον . . . ἔπος. I assume that Maximus knew it from a collection of quotations (compare below).

Dodds, apparently independently, discovered the actual phrase in Crates Comicus frag. 17. 1 Kassel-Austin (= frag. 15. 1 Kock). This does not exclude a tragic source for Crates, since in him ἀλλ' ἀντίθεος τοι may itself be paratragic. *Fata sua habent locutiones*.<sup>6</sup>

As for Maximus, I consider it improbable in the extreme that he realized that Plato's ἀλλ(ᾷ) ἀντίθεος τοι was in fact an actual poetic quotation. Rather, what we have before us is another example of Maximus' style in the making. His native ear picked up the elegant phrasing in Plato and he appropriated it. Here, too, where again the expression contains no concept integral to this thesis, Maximus presumably wished his audience to hear the phrase as his own.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the sort of minute stylistic craftsmanship—call it scissors-and-paste technique if you prefer—which has been illustrated above provides an important clue to Maximus' use of his sources. It seems to be widely believed that Maximus was dependent chiefly upon florilegia or manuals for his borrowings; Koniaris states this position most clearly: "Even in cases where Maximus quotes we cannot be reasonably certain that he derived the quotations from original sources; and the Platonic and other 'flashes' of vocabulary and thought in him may well derive to a large extent from secondary sources, from manuals περὶ ἀρεσκόντων, from compilations of excerpts, from abridged versions of texts, etc. Hobein . . . is right in suggesting that a large part of Maximus' text derives not from specific texts but from such θέματα and τόποι that had long ago become common property regardless of their origin: *e trivio plerumque petita sunt quae apud Maximum legimus*."<sup>7</sup>

I would subscribe to this as a general statement; Maximus certainly must have owed a large debt to handbooks. But if it is maintained that this author never went directly to the original sources, at least in the case of Homer and certain dialogues of Plato, I must disagree. The method of composition illustrated above argues otherwise. Pl. *Gorg.* 461E, to give one example, never found its way into handbook or anthology.

#### 40. 6 (p. 470. 11–16 H.):

ἐὰν δὲ Λεωνίδαν λέγῃς καὶ Ἀγησίλαον, γνωρίζω τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μέμνημαι τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, καὶ ἐπαινῶ τὴν εὐγένειαν. εἶθε μοι καὶ τὸ Ἀριστείδου γένος ἦν Ἀθηναίων, εἶθε τὸ Σωκράτους ἐτίμησα ἂν τούτους ὡς Ἡρακλείδας, ὡς Περσείδας, ὡς εὐπατρίδας.

Noble birth is at issue and Maximus conjures up by name some of the great old families, or clans, of μυθιστορία. The name εὐπατρίδαι is a generic term for the privileged aristocracy, known to us especially from Athens, and not originally the name of any specific γένος.<sup>8</sup> But Maximus was no historian, and what is wanted here is a proper name to correspond to Ἡρακλείδας and Περσείδας. That εὐπατρίδαι sometimes came to be felt as such, in the course of time, is already

6. For further details and evidence, as well as exposition of the relevance of the phrase in the Platonic context of the *Gorgias*, see *Studies in Greek Texts*, pp. 123–24.

7. "Maximus of Tyre," p. 104, n. 38.

8. See on this esp. H. T. Wade-Gery's paper, "Eupatridai, Archons, and Areopagus," *CQ* 25 (1931): 1–11 (= *Essays in Greek History* [Oxford, 1958], pp. 86–115).

clear from Isocrates 16. 25: ὁ γὰρ πατήρ πρὸς μὲν ἀνδρῶν ἦν Εὐπατριδῶν, ὦν τὴν εὐγένειαν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπωνυμίας ῥάδιον γινῶναι, πρὸς γυναικῶν δ' Ἀλκμεωνιδῶν κτλ.<sup>9</sup> F. Kiechle in *Der kleine Pauly* (Munich, 1979), s.v. *Eupatridai*, states: "die Eupatridai später, wie die Eumolpiden, als besonderes Geschlecht galten." See also LSJ, s.v. εὐπατρίδης II, for apparent references to a specific family. Read therefore what the parallelism requires: ὡς Ἡρακλείδας, ὡς Περσεΐδας, ὡς Εὐπατρίδας. We need feel no compulsion to define the term more precisely than Maximus has.

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9. How Isocrates himself understood Εὐπατριδῶν is uncertain, but irrelevant. The point is that the Greek of this sentence is such that it naturally suggests a particular family, and the words have in fact often been so taken.

## ROSE WITHOUT MARY

nam ieiuna quidem clivosi glarea ruris  
vix humilis apibus casias roremque ministrat.

[Verg. *G.* 2. 212–13]

Heyne and others were suspicious of *rorem* = *rorem marinum*, but later commentators cite Pliny *HN* 24. 101 *ex rore supra dicto*—not a perfect parallel, since it refers back to *ros marinum* in 24. 99. R. Renehan believes he has discovered a better one in *Anth. Lat.* 24 Riese (= 11 Shackleton Bailey). But it is in my opinion highly dubious: see *CQ* 31 (1981): 471–72 and 33 (1983): 301. The desiderated parallel is, however, to be found where neither Vergil's annotators nor dictionaries have observed it (so far as I am aware). Ov. *Fast.* 4. 437–42 is a list of flowers and plants gathered by Proserpina and her companions before Dis interrupted them:

has, hyacinthe, tenes, illas, amarante, moraris;  
pars thyma, pars rorem, pars meliloton amat.

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True, manuscripts and editors are at odds with one another about the reading in the pentameter. *Rorem pars* is in the Monacensis, not a first-class authority. The oldest and best witnesses are divided among *rore et*, *rores pars*, *flores pars*, and *casiam pars*. The last, according to Wormell and Courtney (Teubner, 1978), comes from Verg. *G.* 4. 304 *thymum casiamque recentis*; but cf. also *G.* 2. 213 above.

Modern editors are eclectic. Frazer (1929), without remark in his commentary, and Le Bonniec (1970) have *rorem, pars*; Ehwald-Levy (Teubner, 1924) *rores et*; G. A. Davies in Postgate's *Corpus* (1905) *casiam, pars*. The favorite, however, is a conjecture of Landi's, *rhoean* (or *rhoien*) *et* (*roien* or *roiē* *et* are cited from *deteriores*), which has been adopted by Lenz (1932), Bömer (1958), and Wormell—